Journal of Philosophy of Emotion https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Philosophy of Emotion</em>&nbsp;(<em>JPE)</em>&nbsp;aims to be an internationally recognized, open access, philosophy journal specializing in the publication of high-quality, peer-reviewed papers that address philosophical interests on the topic of emotion, broadly construed (e.g., including affect), from&nbsp;a wide range of philosophical or interdisciplinary perspectives, across all traditions. The&nbsp;<em>JPE</em> holds that philosophers of emotion can learn from experts in other areas and disciplines, and vice versa, and is especially interested in work that demonstrate how issues in the philosophy of emotion are relevant to other areas in philosophy and other disciplines, and vice versa. It seeks to encourage an open exchange of ideas and appropriate, reasonable dialogue between scholars by providing a space where interdisciplinary pursuits in the philosophy of emotion can flourish. It does not promote any specific ideology, school, tradition, or methodology, but asks contributors to maintain an equal respect for all co-participants in its endeavors. It also shares the core values of<strong><em>&nbsp;</em></strong>diversity, inclusiveness, collegiality/community, honesty, integrity, the principle of charity, rigorous scholarship, and clarity of content with its affiliated society, the <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/societyforphilosophyofemotion/home">Society for Philosophy of Emotion</a>.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> en-US <p>The&nbsp;<em>JPE&nbsp;</em>is&nbsp;a biannual online, open access scholarly journal that publishes full-length articles, book symposiums, book reviews, and special issues under the&nbsp;<a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License</a><em>,</em>&nbsp;in which authors will retain the copyright to their work (i.e., their initial manuscript and any revisions submitted to the&nbsp;<em>JPE</em>), and manage their own permissions for other uses. The rights to any material produced by the <em>JPE</em>, including any pre-publication proofs, are held by the&nbsp;<em>JPE</em> as the licensor under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. The&nbsp;<em>JPE</em> gives authors the right to use and distribute their published articles in accordance with this license, however, we advise authors and readers to please consult the terms of this license before using any of the material that is published on the&nbsp;<em>JPE&nbsp;</em>site.&nbsp;</p> jpe.team@jpeonline.org (Cecilea Mun) jpe.team@jpeonline.org (Cecilea Mun) Fri, 31 Jan 2020 00:00:00 -0500 OJS 3.1.2.1 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss 60 Editorial: Introducing the Journal of Philosophy of Emotion https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/43 Cecilea Mun Copyright (c) 2020 Cecilea Mun http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/43 Tue, 21 Jan 2020 02:04:24 -0500 Envy's Non-Innocent Victims https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/25 <p>Envy has often been seen as a vice and the envied as its victims. I suggest that this plausible view has an important limitation: the envied sometimes actively try to provoke envy. They may, thus, be non-innocent victims. Having argued for this thesis, I draw some practical implications.</p> Iskra Fileva Copyright (c) 2019 Iskra Fileva http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/25 Fri, 31 Jan 2020 00:00:00 -0500 Is Contempt Redeemable? https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/10 <p>In this essay, I will focus on the two main objections that have been adduced against the moral acceptability of contempt: the fact that it embraces a whole person and not merely some deed or aspect of a person’s character, and the way that when addressed to a person in this way, it amounts to a denial of the very personhood of its target.</p> Ronald de Sousa Copyright (c) 2019 Ronald de Sousa https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/10 Fri, 31 Jan 2020 00:00:00 -0500 Forgiveness and the Multiple Functions of Anger https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/7 <p>This paper defends an account of forgiveness that is sensitive to recent work on anger. Like others, we claim anger involves an appraisal, namely that someone has done something wrong. But, we add, anger has two further functions. First, anger communicates to the wrongdoer that her act has been appraised as wrong and demands she feel guilty. This function enables us to explain why apologies make it reasonable to forgo anger and forgive. Second, anger sanctions the wrongdoer for what she has done. This function allows us to explore the moral status of forgiveness, including why forgiveness is typically elective.</p> Antony G Aumann, Zac Cogley Copyright (c) 2019 Antony G Aumann, Zac Cogley http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/7 Fri, 31 Jan 2020 00:00:00 -0500 Emotions, Reasons, and Norms https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/12 <p>A tension between acting morally and acting rationally is apparent in analyses of moral emotions that ascribe an inherent subjectivity to ethical thinking, leading thence to irresolvable differences between rational agents. This paper offers an account of emotional worthiness that shows how, even if moral reasons fall short of philosophical criteria of rationality, we can still accord reasonableness to them and recognize that the deliberative weight of social norms is sufficient to address the moral limitations of strategic rationality.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> Evan Simpson Copyright (c) 2019 Evan Simpson http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/12 Fri, 31 Jan 2020 00:00:00 -0500 Précis: Knowing Emotions https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/42 <p>Summary of <em>Knowing Emotions: Truthfulness and Recognition in Affective Experience.</em></p> <p><em>&nbsp;</em></p> Rick A. Furtak Copyright (c) 2019 Rick A. Furtak http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/42 Fri, 31 Jan 2020 00:00:00 -0500 Emotional Cognitivism without Representationalism https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/35 <p>In <em>Knowing Emotions</em>, Rick Anthony Furtak seeks an account that does justice to both the cognitive and corporeal dimensions of our emotional lives. Concerning the latter dimension, he holds that emotions serve to represent axiological features of the world. Against such a representationalist picture, I shall suggest an alternative way to understand how our emotions gear in with the rest of our cognitive states.<span class="Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></p> Dave Beisecker Copyright (c) 2019 Dave Beisecker http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/35 Fri, 31 Jan 2020 00:00:00 -0500 Emotional Knowledge and the Emotional A Priori https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/27 <p>In the following comments, I will raise no major objection to Furtak’s main line of argument. My questions are essentially requests for clarification. They focus on three key expressions: first, the “unified” character of emotional agitation and intentionality; second, the unique “mode of cognition” claimed for emotions; and third, the “emotional a priori.”</p> Ronald de Sousa Copyright (c) 2019 Ronald de Sousa http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/27 Fri, 31 Jan 2020 00:00:00 -0500 What are Emotions For? https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/33 <p>What would it mean for an emotion to successfully “recognize” something about an object toward which it is directed? Although the notion of "emotional recognition" is central to Rick Furtak’s <em>Knowing Emotions</em>, the text does not provide an account of this concept that enables us to assess the extent to which a given emotional response is recognitive. This article draws from the text to articulate a novel account of emotional recognition. According to this account, emotional recognition can be assessed not only in terms of the “accuracy” of an emotional construal in a strictly epistemological sense, but also in terms of the quasi-ethical ideal of responding emotionally to what we encounter in ways that are “specific,” “deep," and “balanced."<span class="Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></p> Francisco Gallegos Copyright (c) 2019 Francisco Gallegos http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/33 Fri, 31 Jan 2020 00:00:00 -0500 Knowing Emotions: Replies to de Sousa, Beisecker, and Gallegos https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/30 <p>Beginning with de Sousa's question about how my position is related to that of "enactive" theorists, I spell out my emphasis on the unity of affective experience, and say more about my conception of the emotional "a priori." In response to Beisecker, I elaborate by way of a literary example on how a significant fact can exist without yet having 'registered' in one's emotional awareness, and on the basis of this I reject the claim that emotions constitute significance. Finally, prompted by Gallegos, I elaborate on why, on my view, a valuable thing must have indeterminately many axiological qualities, and explain how a multifaceted world can ground a plurality of emotional standpoints.</p> Rick A. Furtak Copyright (c) 2019 Rick A. Furtak http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://jpeonline.org/ojs/index.php/jpe/article/view/30 Fri, 31 Jan 2020 00:00:00 -0500