Emotional Cognitivism without Representationalism

  • Dave Beisecker
Keywords: emotivism, expressivism, cognitivism, representationalism

Abstract

In Knowing Emotions, Rick Anthony Furtak seeks an account that does justice to both the cognitive and corporeal dimensions of our emotional lives. Concerning the latter dimension, he holds that emotions serve to represent axiological features of the world. Against such a representationalist picture, I shall suggest an alternative way to understand how our emotions gear in with the rest of our cognitive states. 

References

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Furtak, Rick Anthony. 2018. Knowing Emotions: Truthfulness and Recognition in Affective Experience. New York: Oxford. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190492045.001.0001

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James, William. 1884. "What is an Emotion?" Mind 9 (34): 188-205. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/os-IX.34.188

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Published
2020-01-31
How to Cite
Beisecker, Dave. 2020. “Emotional Cognitivism Without Representationalism”. Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1), 113-22. https://doi.org/10.33497/jpe.v1i1.35.