Emotions, Reasons, and Norms

  • Evan Simpson Memorial University of Newfoundland
Keywords: collective intentionality, emotional fittingness, emotional worthiness, rationality, reasonableness

Abstract

A tension between acting morally and acting rationally is apparent in analyses of moral emotions that ascribe an inherent subjectivity to ethical thinking, leading thence to irresolvable differences between rational agents. This paper offers an account of emotional worthiness that shows how, even if moral reasons fall short of philosophical criteria of rationality, we can still accord reasonableness to them and recognize that the deliberative weight of social norms is sufficient to address the moral limitations of strategic rationality.

 

 

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Published
2020-01-31
How to Cite
Simpson, Evan. 2020. “Emotions, Reasons, and Norms”. Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1), 72-97. https://doi.org/10.33497/jpe.v1i1.12.